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3 Labour institutions and economic 
development: A conceptual framework 
with reference to Asia 
Gary S. Fields1 
I. Introduction 
The goal of economic development is to raise standards of living 
throughout an economy. Most households' standards of living are 
determined by the earnings of household members in the labour market. 
(Throughout this paper, the term "labour market" is used to include both 
wage employment and self-employment, whether regular or casual.) 
Consequently, raising the real earnings of a fully-employed labour force 
is rightly viewed as a primary means of improving living standards. The 
institutional arrangements governing labour markets help determine the rate 
and character of economic development. An excellent, yet concise 
definition of "institution" is that given by Irma Adelman: the rules of the 
game, plus the behavioural patterns in response to them. 
After a long hiatus, mainstream economic theorists have returned to 
the task of modelling economic development. Lucas [1988] states that the 
goal of the "new growth theory" is to explain differences in income levels 
and in growth rates among countries. However, I would define the 
question of interest more broadly than that: it should include not only how 
the total income grows but how the benefits are distributed. But even for 
purposes of Lucas' more limited question, the labour market charac-
terizations in the new growth theory models (e.g. those reviewed in Barro 
and Romer [1990] and those published in a special issue of the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, May 1991) are still quite primitive. In these models, 
at any given time, all workers have the same human capital. Furthermore, 
all workers with a given human capital endowment receive the same wage. 
These assumptions are for analytical ease; however, they are at odds with 
the facts. 
' Cornell University, United States. 
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Ideally, one would want to model labour institutions and economic 
development in explicitly dynamic fashion. What we would want ultimately 
is to embed institutionally-sensitive labour market characterizations into 
dynamic development models. Unfortunately, we are not yet at that stage. 
First, we need appropriate labour market models. 
In this chapter, I set forth a framework for analysing how labour 
markets function under existing institutional arrangements and predicting 
how they would respond to alternative changes and policy interventions. 
I seek to blend logical rigour with institutional realism in a stylized way. 
My approach borrows from orthodox neoclassical analysis where relevant, 
and departs from those characterizations when the standard assumptions are 
empirically untenable. 
To illustrate this, standard economic analysis posits the law of one 
wage, i.e. competition in labour markets is assumed to bring about equal 
wages for all workers with given skill at a level which just clears the 
market. In those circumstances where the assumption of a single 
market-clearing wage is empirically false, the analysis must include wage 
diversity and unemployment. I stylize wage diversity by formulating a 
dualistic labour market model, linking the two sectors through product and 
factor markets. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section II, I exposit 
the basic neoclassical labour market model: an upward-sloping labour 
supply curve, a downward-sloping labour demand curve, and market 
determination of wages and employment. This is a useful place to start, not 
only because it is familiar but because it is descriptively accurate in some 
(but by no means all) labour market situations in Asia. This model 
maintains a number of assumptions about labour market institutions and 
motivations for behaviour. These institutional and behavioural assumptions 
are highlighted and some implications are derived from them. However, 
when these assumptions are at odds with empirical reality, as often they 
are, the basic neoclassical model is not applicable and should not be used. 
It is for this reason that I use the basic model to understand the 
rapidly-rising real wages in Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan (China) since the 1960s but propose an alternative model to fit 
these economies' earlier experiences. 
The next two sections then go beyond the basic labour market model 
in a variety of ways, presenting numerous illustrations from different 
countries in Asia. In Section III, I introduce into models of single labour 
markets a number of additional features, including unemployment, 
non-market wage-setting institutions, efficiency wage considerations, 
workers' resistance to wage-cutting, insider-outsider models, transactions 
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costs and asymmetric information. Then, in Section IV, I proceed to the 
analysis of multiple labour markets linked one to another and discuss wage 
dualism and labour market segmentation, differences among workers in 
human capital, and labour market discrimination. What emerges is a richer 
characterization of labour markets than in the textbooks, but one which still 
carries the flavour of supply and demand as a theory of employment and 
unemployment, though not necessarily as a theory of wage determination. 
//. The basic neoclassical labour market model: 
Positive analysis 
Consider the labour market model depicted in Figure 1. It is 
sometimes said that models such as this are devoid of institutional 
characterization. This is wrong. Rather, such models make assumptions 
about institutions. It is important to identify what those assumptions are. 
1. Assumptions of the basic neoclassical labour market model 
Assumption 1: Labour is homogeneous 
Workers are assumed to be identical in relevant dimensions and 
employers are assumed to treat them as such. This is a simplifying 
assumption, one quickly relaxed in more sophisticated analysis. 
Assumption 2: There is a single unified labour market 
This means that the same institutional arrangements apply in all labour 
markets, e.g. wages are set by supply and demand everywhere. This too 
is a simplifying assumption, relaxed in many different ways. 
Assumption 3: There are numerous buyers and sellers 
No individual worker or firm is large enough to influence the terms 
and conditions of employment. 
Assumption 4: Information is full and complete 
Workers are assumed to know about the wages and other conditions 
of employment in all jobs. Similarly, firms have full information about all 
the economically relevant characteristics of each current or potential 
worker. 
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Assumption 5: Mobility is essentially costless 
Workers can switch firms at essentially zero mobility cost. Likewise, 
firms can switch what, how much, where and how they produce, the only 
costs being those required to purchase the relevant inputs. 
Assumption 6: Workers seek to maximize utility 
Labour earnings are assumed to contribute positively to utility, 
whereas working itself contributes negatively to utility. Each worker tries 
to attain the highest level of utility possible. 
Assumption 7: The supply of labour to a labour market 
is an upward-sloping function of the wage 
Other things equal, when the real wage paid in a labour market rises, 
some additional workers come into the labour market in question from 
other labour markets, while others enter the labour force for the first time. 
Assumption 8: Firms seek to maximize profits 
Firms will do whatever is within their power in order to earn as much 
they can. In particular, they will hire workers only to the extent that this 
adds to their profits. 
Assumption 9: The demand for labour in a labour market 
is a downward-sloping function of the wage 
Other things equal, when the real wage required to be paid in a labour 
market rises, employers will tend to substitute capital in place of labour to 
produce any given level of output, and will also tend to reduce their scales 
of operation, demanding less labour for both reasons. 
Assumption 10: Wages are set by labour supply 
and labour demand 
If the wage is not at the level W* in Figure 1, equilibrating forces are 
set into motion driving the wage to that level. These include the systematic 
movement of workers from low wage to high wage employers and the 
systematic movement of firms from high wage to low wage locations. It 
is assumed that no institutional impediment prevents the wage from rising 
or falling to level W*. 
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Figure 1 . The textbook labour market model 
w 
Figure 2 . The effects of sector-specific growth in a two-sector 
labour market w i t h market-clearing wages 
W, 
o, E E' 0 , 
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2. Positive economic analysis under the basic 
neoclassical assumptions 
Suppose for the moment that these assumptions are fulfilled. What are 
the model's predictions for economic development? The single most 
important one is that if the derived demand for labour increases in one 
sector of the economy, it will result in an increase in wages not only in 
that sector but in all sectors of the economy. 
The analysis is aided by considering Figure 2. The initial demand for 
labour curve in Sector 1 is D,, which is downward sloping relative to 
origin O,. Similarly, the initial demand for labour curve in Sector 2, D2, 
is downward sloping relative to origin 02. The labour market clears when 
the same wage is paid in the two sectors and the combined demand for 
labour by employers in the two sectors exactly equals the available labour 
supply. At this wage, denoted by W, = W2 in the figure, 0,E workers will 
be employed in Sector 1 and the remaining 02E workers will be employed 
in Sector 2. 
Suppose now that one of the sectors experiences economic growth, so 
that more labour is demanded in that sector than before. This is illustrated 
by a rightward shift of the demand for labour curve in that sector from D, 
to D,'. Following the same logic as in the preceding paragraph, the model 
predicts that the labour market will equilibrate at a new, higher wage in 
both sectors of the economy (W,' = W2') and with a reallocation of the 
labour force toward the growing sector (EE' workers shift from Sector 2 
to Sector 1). 
Empirical evidence strongly supports this prediction. Take for instance 
the changes in employment and wages that have taken place during the 
economic development of the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) of 
East Asia — Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
(China). In the last thirty years, these economies have achieved virtually 
unparalleled rates of aggregate economic growth, approaching or surpas-
sing 10 per cent per annum over long periods. Labour market conditions 
have moved in parallel fashion [Fields, 1984]. All four of these economies 
have experienced generally full employment (unemployment rates of 4 per 
cent or less). Labour earnings have increased sharply. From approximately 
1960 to 1980, real wages rose by a factor of four in Taiwan, a factor of 
three in Korea, and a factor of two and a half in Hong Kong. In the 1980s, 
real wages in Korea doubled again — see the papers by Park and You in 
this volume. 
As a result of the attainment of full employment and rapidly-rising 
real wages, standards of living became markedly higher in economic terms 
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in the Asian NIEs. One measure of this is the poverty rates in these 
economies. Poverty fell dramatically in all of them: from 18 per cent to 
7 per cent in ten years in Hong Kong, from 41 per cent to 15 per cent in 
11 years in Korea, from 37 per cent to 18 per cent in 14 years in 
Singapore, and from 35 per cent to 10 per cent in eight years in Taiwan. 
What brought about these improvements in real earnings and standards 
of living in the recent decades? The answer, according to the basic labour 
market model described above, is that the labour market both facilitated 
economic growth and served to transmit this growth to households, thereby 
raising their standards of living. It bears mention that different styles of 
growth were responsible for the shifting labour demand conditions — 
government is much more heavily involved in the economies of Singapore 
and Korea than in those of Hong Kong and Taiwan [Scitovsky, 1986; 
Krause, 1988] — and the sources of growth were different in the different 
economies: technical change was a major factor in the economic growth of 
Hong Kong, while in Singapore technical change contributed virtually 
nothing to that country's growth [Young, 1992]. 
The consistency of real-world evidence with the model's predictions 
suggests that the multisector neoclassical framework is indeed a useful 
analytical framework for understanding changing labour market conditions 
in the East Asian NIEs since the 1960s. Real-world conditions do not 
appear to be so greatly different from the assumed conditions of the model 
as to invalidate the model's qualitative conclusions, at least for that time 
period. 
3. Positive economic analysis: The need for alternative 
models in alternative circumstances 
The basic neoclassical model outlined above offers a precisely 
specified economic framework with which to perform positive economic 
analysis of the workings of labour markets. The positive model can and 
should be challenged in terms of empirical realism. 
On these grounds, the basic neoclassical model cannot explain earlier 
labour market developments in the East Asian NIEs. When economic 
growth took place in those economies in the 1950s, real wages did not rise. 
What did rise was employment. Those economies began with substantial 
unemployment. More workers were available than employers wanted to 
hire. When employers wanted to hire more workers to expand output, they 
were able to do so at the prevailing wage. It was only when no more 
labour was available to be employed at that wage that wages started to rise. 
This was because employers had to raise wages in order to attract more 
720 WORKERS, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIA 
workers. If the challenges to the basic neoclassical model are to be 
constructive (remember: the goal is to formulate the most useful analytical 
framework possible), care should be taken to avoid two pitfalls. One is to 
argue that because one or more of the assumptions presented in the first 
part of this section does not hold we must discard the entire approach. Of 
course, inaccurate assumptions should be replaced by others which better 
characterize a particular country's circumstances, but those assumptions of 
the basic neoclassical model that are accurate should be retained. 
Secondly, care must be taken not to replace a precise assumption by 
a vague one. If a precise assumption is to be replaced, it must be by an 
equally precise alternative. To illustrate, consider Assumption 1, which 
maintains that a country has a single unified labour market in which the 
returns to labour are equalized across sectors and across individuals. 
Generally, we know this is not the case — comparable workers are paid 
higher wages in some sectors of an economy than in others, some workers 
are better educated than others and are rewarded differently in the labour 
market, and employers discriminate against some groups on the basis of 
characteristics not related to productivity. Observations such as these imply 
that there is not a single unified labour market in many circumstances. 
However, this is not a sufficiently precise alternative assumption. For 
analytical purposes, we must specify how the various labour market 
segments operate and how they are linked together, if at all. 
Figure 3 presents an alternative to Assumption 1 which is helpful in 
explaining changing labour market conditions in the early economic 
development of a number of Asian economies. The figure depicts the 
high-wage sector in a dualistic labour market. The effect of economic 
growth is to shift the demand for labour curve rightward. Here, though, 
shifts in the demand for labour result in reduced unemployment, not higher 
wages — precisely what happened in the earlier phases of economic 
development in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
Figures 1 and 2 are the basic neoclassical labour market model; 
Figure 3 is not. What the preceding discussion shows is that the basic 
neoclassical model holds some but not all of the time. The different models 
apply to the same group of countries at different times. 
It is important to understand where the two models differ. It is in their 
characterization of wage-setting institutions. The model of Figures 1 and 
2 embodies the assumption of market wage determination through supply 
and demand, whereas the model of Figure 3 embodies a different assump-
tion: wages are set above the market-clearing level for some reason. 
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Figure 3. High wage sector in a dualistic labour market 
W 
W 
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 „ 0 
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Figure 4. A single labour market with higher-than-market-clearing wages 
W 
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The point I want to make by this is that no one model will do. Rather, 
a number of alternative models are needed to analyse how labour markets 
change in the course of economic development. The building blocks of the 
models must be modified to fit the circumstances. Because conditions are 
very different in different countries at different times, the models must also 
differ. 
In Section III, I further discuss some of these alternative institutional 
assumptions in the context of positive labour market analysis. 
///. Beyond the basic labour market model: 
Unemployment and non-market-clearing wages 
in models of single labour markets 
1. Unemployment 
The single biggest problem with the basic labour market model is the 
absence of unemployment. One defence of the basic model is to maintain 
that such unemployment as exists is frictional — those workers seeking 
jobs and those firms with vacancies have not yet matched up with one 
another. Indeed, in some Asian economies — Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand — unemployment rates are under 
5 per cent, a level quite consistent with the frictional unemployment 
characterization. Bertrand and Squire [1980] found that unemployment 
rates in all regions of Thailand during both wet and dry seasons were 
below 1 per cent of the labour force. But elsewhere in Asia, much higher 
unemployment rates have been observed: 13 per cent in Jakarta and 11 per 
cent in Metro Manila, for example [Rodgers, 1989]. These rates exceed 
any reasonable standard of friction. This suggests that something more 
permanent than friction is responsible for the observed unemployment. 
The natural modification of the basic neoclassical labour market model 
— one which generates unemployment as a permanent feature of labour 
markets — is to introduce a higher-than-market-clearing wage. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4. As long as the wage remains at a level like W , 
unemployment will persist. 
Models of unemployment caused by above-market-clearing wages 
raise the question of why the wage remains at the level it does. The 
literature offers a number of possible answers. 
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2. Institutional wage-setting models 
The earliest was the class of institutional models. Five institutional 
forces, singly or in combination, have potent influences on wages in much 
of Asia: (i) minimum wage laws are commonplace and when enforced 
cause wages to be higher than they otherwise would be; (ii) labour unions 
are often very strong. At times, this is because of the close association 
between organized labour and the political party in power. Other times, it 
is because labour unions are encouraged as a means of achieving higher 
wages for workers; (iii) pay policy for government workers often sets the 
pattern of wages for the rest of the economy, and those in charge have a 
propensity to pay high wages to all government workers, including 
themselves; (iv) also, multinational corporations often pay high wages, 
partly to maintain parity between expatriate and local employees and partly 
(in some instances) to appear to be good corporate citizens and thereby to 
avoid expropriation or expulsion; (v) finally, labour codes may require 
higher wages, fringe benefits, and severance pay, resulting at times in 
bloated work forces and inflated labour costs. 
Institutional wage-setting above market-clearing levels characterizes 
many Asian economies. For instance, Starr [1981] discusses minimum 
wages in a number of developing countries. Yet, he comments explicitly 
about the absence of institutional wage-setting in Hong Kong, Korea, and 
Singapore (and presumably in Taiwan, though at that time Taiwan could 
not be mentioned in an official ILO publication). Evidence on the 
prevalence of market wage-setting in the four NIEs (except for occasional 
lapses in Singapore) is detailed in Fields and Wan [1989]. It is no accident 
that all four of these economies have sustained very low rates of 
unemployment: artificially high wages were not present, so labour use was 
not discouraged. 
3. Efficiency-wage models 
After the institutional models came the class of models known as 
efficiency wage models. These models share two key behavioural 
assumptions: (i) a worker who is paid a higher wage will be a more 
efficient employee; and (ii) paying an efficiency wage may be in the firm's 
profit-maximizing interests. 
Efficiency wage theory comes in two variants; see, for instance, 
Akerlof and Yellen [1986] and Weiss [1990] for reviews of this literature. 
One variant maintains that by offering higher wages, a firm may be able 
to induce higher productivity from a given individual. This may be because 
more highly-paid workers are better-nourished and hence stronger, or more 
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willing to work harder or faster, or less likely to quit or be absent, or less 
likely to shirk or commit malfeasance on the job. A second variant of 
efficiency wage theory maintains that by offering higher wages, a firm may 
be able to attract more productive individuals. This may be because the 
firm can attract individuals with more education and training and/or select 
those who score better on tests, appear more qualified in job interviews, 
or possess observable correlates of high productivity such as good work 
histories. 
When would a firm be willing to pay an efficiency wage? Suppose 
that by paying a 10 per cent higher wage the firm gets a more than 10 per 
cent increase in the productivity of its labour input. The firm's profits are 
thereby raised. More precisely, it will pay the firm to offer higher wages 
if and only if the marginal proportionate increase in efficiency is greater 
than the marginal proportionate increase in the wage. 
Now, to the extent that efficiency wage considerations are responsible 
for wages being set and remaining above market-clearing levels, a labour 
market equilibrium with unemployment will result. In the basic neoclassical 
model, by contrast, when wages are above market-clearing levels, the la-
bour market is in disequilibrium. This is because firms have an incentive 
to lower wages and the unemployed have an incentive to accept lower 
wages. The consequent lowering of wages will tend to reduce and ultimate-
ly eliminate unemployment. But when efficiency wages are being paid, one 
of the equilibrating forces in standard labour market analysis — the desire 
of profit-maximizing firms to lower wages in the presence of unemploy-
ment — is absent. Firms could lower wages and employ more labour but 
they won't: it is not in their profit-maximizing interest to do so. Wages 
will remain above the market-clearing level and unemployment will 
persist.2 
How important are efficiency wages as an empirical matter? Taking 
India as a case study, the evidence is quite mixed. Rodgers' village studies 
[1975] found that wage variation with seasonal changes in labour market 
conditions was rare and could not be attributed to demand and supply 
factors. Bliss and Stern [1978], on the other hand, reported a "great, even 
bewildering diversity" of wages. In agreement, Binswanger and Rosen-
zweig [1984] cited "pervasive regional, annual, and seasonal variations of 
wages" in most empirical studies that cast doubt on fixed wage models. 
Dreze and Mukherjee [1989] found that the same standard wage often 
2
 For further analysis of other labour market implications of efficiency wages, see 
Bulow and Summers [1986]. 
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applies for several months or even several years. So it is difficult to draw 
a firm conclusion from the available evidence about the presence or 
absence of efficiency wages. 
Recent analysis has noted at least one problem with efficiency wage 
explanations for the persistence of unemployment — the absence of 
long-term contracts. Binswanger and Rosenzweig [1984] observe that 
"long-term employment contracts are not very common in the South and 
Southeast Asian countries. When they are entered into, they seem to be 
based on the demand for specialized skills." Bardhan [1984], Dreze and 
Mukherjee [1989] and many others have also noted the ubiquity of casual 
labour markets throughout Asia. 
In those circumstances in which casual labour markets predominate 
and long-term contracts are absent, it may be difficult for individual 
employers to internalize the benefits of efficiency wages [Basu, 1992; 
Mukherjee and Ray, 1992; Guha, 1989]. Basu (p. 110) puts it thus: "... 
there is a time-lag, often quite long, between wages and productivity... 
Hence, in markets where landlords face a high labour turnover there may 
be little relation between the wage paid by a particular landlord and the 
productivity of his or her workers" (emphasis added). Basu notes that this 
is particularly the case in "casual labour market(s) where labourers are 
hired afresh each day." 
The point raised by Basu and by Mukherjee and Ray has merit in 
those cases where the motivation for efficiency wages is better nutrition: 
the employer who offers today's workers higher wages does not get higher 
productivity today. It is much less applicable to situations in which the 
efficiency gains are immediate, for instance, when the pace of work is 
increased and higher wages are paid to reward workers for working faster. 
In those cases where the labour market is a casual one and where 
wages exceed market-clearing levels, the source of these 
higher-than-market-clearing wages is called into question. Rather than 
employers' resistance to wage cuts being responsible in those instances, 
another explanation must be sought. Several others are discussed in the 
next sections. 
4. Seasonal unemployment 
In rural Asia, seasonal unemployment is endemic; see, for instance, 
Bardhan [1984] and Binswanger and Rosenzweig [1984]. Villagers 
routinely report themselves available and actively looking for work during 
the slack season. Alas, not enough jobs are available for all who wish to 
work. 
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Figure 5. Unemployment in the slack season 
W 
D peak 
slack 
'-slack "-i peak 
An orthodox analyst would expect that the peak-season labour demand 
curve would shift leftward in the slack season, tending to lower wages. 
The existence of slack-season unemployment might then be understood in 
either of two ways. One is that the wage may indeed have fallen by enough 
to clear the market and that the unemployment is more illusory than real. 
The other is that the slack-season wage has not fallen sufficiently far to 
eliminate unemployment. 
Consider the first explanation. Figure 5 depicts the leftward shift of 
the labour demand curve from D^^ to Dslack. If the wage falls from W ^ 
to Ws,ack, then there will be no seasonal unemployment — all who want to 
work at the prevailing wage are working at that wage. However, the 
remaining Lp^-L^,* persons may be willing to work at wage W ^ but not 
at the current wage Ws,ack. Those workers may regard themselves as 
unemployed and they may be counted as such in the surveys. Doing this 
goes against the common conception of labour supply as consisting of those 
persons who wish to work at the prevailing wage. Of course, we may want 
to redefine what we mean by unemployment — for example, by classifying 
as unemployed anyone who would like to work but is not at work. 
Redefining unemployment is possible but would go against standard ILO 
definitions and conceptions. 
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Slack-season unemployment may arise for another reason: the 
slack-season wage may fall but not by enough to clear the slack-season 
market. Consider a wage such as W° in Figure 5. The slack-season wage 
may fall to W° but not as far as Ws,ack for any of several reasons: 
(i) institutional barriers such as minimum wages prevent the wage from 
falling that far; (ii) efficiency-wage considerations lead employers not to 
offer wages below W° (nutritional reasons, for example); or (iii) the labour 
market may not be a casual one — rather certain elements carry over 
across time periods. This last point requires further elaboration. 
Some employers find it advantageous to maintain a supply of 
permanent labourers. These labourers must be fed in the slack season if 
they are going to be strong enough to work in the peak season. They may 
offer those particular labourers higher wages in the slack season so that 
those workers will be ready for work in the peak season. Casual workers 
who are not part of such permanent relationships might offer to work in 
the slack season at Ws,ack and yet will not be hired.3 
A different reason for the slack-season wage not to be lowered to the 
market-clearing level is offered by Mukherjee and Ray [1992]. They 
postulate a form of "everyday peasant resistance" whereby workers have 
bargaining power in the slack season precisely because they have 
bargaining power in the peak season. In their words (p. 229): "In the slack 
season, a labourer has no option but to accept any wage offer not less than 
his reservation wage. However, depending on the state of affairs in the 
peak season, a labourer may decide to refuse to work for the farmers that 
have been unfair in his opinion, in the sense of paying a 'low' wage... The 
farmers are aware of these possibilities and act accordingly." The authors 
find that under this model, nearly all equilibrium wage configurations are 
characterized by wage payments that exceed the reservation wage despite 
the presence of slack season involuntary unemployment. What the 
explanations offered in the preceding paragraphs have in common is that 
employers' actions in the slack season affect their ability to hire in the peak 
season, when labour is urgently needed. They pay more than they need to 
in the slack season so that they can get the labour they need in the peak 
season. Involuntary unemployment in the slack season results. 
5. Worker-side resistance to wage cuts 
Let us return to the context of a casual labour market. Suppose we 
find that wages are above market-clearing levels in a casual labour market 
I thank Pranab Bardhan for making this point. 
128 WORKERS, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ASIA 
in which individual employers are unlikely to be able to internalize the 
benefits of efficiency wages. Suppose further that no obvious institutional 
factor such as a union or a minimum wage is present. Another factor may 
be at work keeping wages in such a labour market above the market-
clearing level and that is resistance on the part of workers to wage cuts. 
According to basic neoclassical labour market theory, if wages are 
above market-clearing levels, unemployed workers would be expected to 
bid wages down in order to secure jobs. Yet, various authors including 
Bardhan and Rudra [1981], Rudra [1982], Dreze and Mukherjee [1989] 
and Osmani [1991] have found that unemployed workers in India and 
Bangladesh do not do this. The question is why. 
Arguments given by Dreze and Mukherjee [1989], Solow [1990] and 
Osmani [1991] suggest the following explanation. Casual labour markets 
in rural Asia may be thought to be comprised of many potential employers 
and many potential employees who negotiate as frequently as daily with 
one another. Their strategies in these negotiations may be thought of in 
game-theory terms. In particular, when each worker decides what wage 
rate to offer to work for, he takes into account the effects of his actions on 
the likely behaviour of others and the effects of their reactions on his 
opportunities. Now, if the worker offers to work for less than the "going 
wage" in a particular locality, s/he may figure that others will also offer 
to work for that lower wage rather than remain unemployed. If the demand 
for farm labour has less than unit elasticity, the lower wage will not be 
counterbalanced by a correspondingly higher employment rate. The 
worker's expected income thus falls. S/he is also working more, thereby 
consuming less leisure. For both these reasons, the worker's expected 
utility falls. Anticipating these consequences of offering to work for a 
lower wage, the worker does not offer to do so even though s/he expe-
riences involuntary unemployment some of the time. In this way, wages 
might remain above market-clearing levels, not because of formal 
wage-setting institutions nor because of employer-side resistance to wage 
cuts, but rather because of worker-side resistance. 
6. Insider-outsider models of unemployment 
Another explanation for unemployment pertains to those situations in 
which labour markets are not casual. In non-casual (i.e. "non-spot") situa-
tions, certain individuals are incumbents in jobs, and for this reason their 
positions are not available to others. It becomes important, therefore, to 
distinguish those who have jobs ("the insiders") from those who aspire to 
jobs ("the outsiders"). 
LABOUR INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASIA 729 
Insider-outsider models are developed by Lindbeck and Snower [1988] 
and Blanchard and Summers [1986], among others. Unemployment can 
arise if two conditions hold: (i) the insiders get together to insist upon 
wages and working conditions at higher than market-clearing levels, and 
(ii) the employer finds it more profitable to accede to the insiders' demands 
than to hire from the outside market. 
What would happen if an outsider offers to work for a lower wage 
than the insiders now receive? Because the insiders are experienced, they 
are probably more productive than inexperienced workers would be. 
However, the insiders are typically more expensive than newly-hired 
workers would be. Suppose that the employer compares the productivity 
levels of experienced insiders versus inexperienced outsiders and concludes 
that it would be profitable to replace an insider by an outsider. Remove 
any threat from insiders, and the employer would want to hire the outsider. 
But the insiders can threaten: for example, they can go on strike, not work 
cooperatively with those who are newly-hired, or refuse to train them. 
These threats are effective if they lower the firm's profits by more than the 
firm gains by hiring the outsider. Knowing this, the firm may indeed not 
hire the outsider. 
What we have then is that the unemployed are willing to work for 
lower wages and the firm would be willing to employ them at lower 
wages, with threats from insiders removed. However, the presence of such 
threats may lead the firm not to lower its wage and employ the 
unemployed. Above-market-clearing wages and involuntary unemployment 
result. 
7. Transactions costs and imperfect information in labour 
markets: Positive and normative analysis 
Labour market analysis has been enriched in recent years by the 
application and refinement of models based on transaction costs and/or 
imperfect information. The literature on this is vast; I shall briefly 
summarize some of the highlights. 
The transaction costs school emphasizes that institutions arise in 
labour markets, as elsewhere, in order to lower the costs incurred by 
economic agents in dealing with others. These costs include information, 
negotiation, monitoring, coordination and enforcement of contracts. The 
imperfect information school analyses why particular institutions arise in 
response to limited information and missing markets. 
These types of models have been developed to analyse a variety of 
institutional arrangements which "emerge as substitutes for missing credit, 
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insurance and futures markets in an environment of pervasive risks, 
information asymmetry and moral hazard" [Bardhan, 1989]. Among the 
labour/production relations which have been analysed in such terms are 
interlocked transactions, labour tying, and sharecropping. 
There is now a large literature analysing various forms of tenancy 
contracts, including sharecropping, in terms of transaction costs and 
imperfect information [e.g. Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979; Bardhan, 1984; 
Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985]. In reviewing this literature, Rosenzweig 
[1988] focuses on two themes: access to unmarketable inputs and reduction 
of production risk. One unmarketable input is labour effort: workers may 
not work as hard as possible. The landlord may solve the effort elicitation 
problem by renting the land out to tenants for a fixed fee; the tenant 
becomes the residual claimant on production, hence puts in an appropriate 
amount of effort. While this solves the landlord's problem, it does not 
solve the tenant's. This occurs due to two reasons. One is that under fixed 
rental contracts, all of the risk of production falls on the tenant. If tenants 
are risk-averse and output risk is uninsurable, a fixed rental contract may 
be unbearably risky. "By sharing output, landlords and tenants share 
production risk, and share it optimally when the optimal allocation of 
inputs on tenanted land is enforceable" [Rosenzweig, 1988, p. 740]. The 
other problem is that besides land, the tenant must also obtain suitable 
inputs from the landlord such as managerial knowledge. The landlord has 
a greater incentive to supply such an input if he receives a share of the 
extra output. "It is the double coincidence of moral hazard (two, not one, 
market failures) that makes share tenancy potentially superior to fixed rate 
tenancy, even though neither tenant nor landowner supplies the full level 
of his own input that would be forthcoming under self-cultivation" 
[Rosenzweig, 1988, p. 740, emphasis in the original]. 
The preceding analysis leads to a strong welfare conclusion. Neither 
landlords nor tenants are obligated to organize themselves into 
sharecropping arrangements; fixed rent tenancy and wage employment are 
other possibilities. If we find that production relations are based on 
sharecropping, we may presume that both landlords and tenants gain by 
participating in such arrangements. If they were prevented from forming 
such arrangements, both sides would lose out. As Bardhan [1989, p. 1390] 
cautions in reference to sharecropping: "Its simple abolition, as is often 
demanded on a radical platform, without taking care of the factors that 
gave rise to the institution in the first place, may not necessarily improve 
the conditions of the intended beneficiaries of the abolition programme." 
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Moving from the specific institution of sharecropping to the more 
general issue of welfare and public policy, the literature on imperfect 
information and incomplete markets has produced some strong policy 
conclusions. Bardhan correctly notes that it may not be a good idea to 
outlaw an institution such as sharecropping. However, this does not imply 
that it is optimal to leave the institution alone either. Government 
interventions may be better yet. Stiglitz has demonstrated this in a series 
of papers: Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], Arnott and Stiglitz [1985], and 
Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] deal with contexts characterized by incom-
plete markets and imperfect information in which the laissez-faire equili-
brium is Pareto-inefficient and might possibly be improved upon by 
suitably chosen taxes and subsidies which can make everyone better off. 
However, as Stiglitz carefully notes, certain conditions must be fulfilled for 
the potential positive role of government to become an actual one. That is, 
the government could effect a Pareto improvement if (i) it had sufficient 
knowledge of the structure of the economy; (ii) those responsible for 
implementing government policy had at least as much information as those 
in the private sector; (iii) those responsible for designing and implementing 
government policy had the incentives to direct policies to effect Pareto 
improvements, rather than, for instance, to redistribute income (either from 
the poor to the rich or vice versa, or from everyone else to themselves)... 
[Stiglitz, 1986, pp. 257-258]. 
Rigorous economic analysis sensitive to the particular institutional and 
political circumstances is what is called for. 
8. Other single-sector models 
Space does not permit me to go into all of the interesting labour 
market models that might be applied. I shall merely call the reader's 
attention to some of the more valuable contributions: the analysis by 
Svejnar [1989] of modern sector labour markets under conditions when 
unions and government increase not only firms' wages but also their levels 
of employment, so that firms are no longer on their labour demand curves; 
the analysis of downward wage rigidity in terms of implicit contracts 
offered to risk-averse workers [Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975]; the analysis 
by Amsden [1989] of "getting relative prices wrong"; and Harriss, Kannan 
and Rodgers' [1990] analysis of the determinants of mobility out of 
protected sector jobs and into small scale self-employment. 
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IV. Beyond the basic labour market model: 
Multi-market analysis with heterogeneous 
labour and market segmentation 
7. Introduction to multi-market analysis 
In some Asian countries, the neoclassical market-clearing paradigm 
provides a useful analytical starting point; such models were developed in 
Section II in both a single sector and a multiple sector context. In other 
countries, however, differences in labour market opportunities between 
sectors or between different types of individuals are enormous. Because of 
discrimination, women's labour market opportunities are much more 
limited than men's. The greater the worker's education and skills, the 
higher are his or her employment and earnings potential. Some workers are 
able to find jobs in protected labour market segments, while many others 
are not. And so on. 
In view of these institutional realities, one would be hard-pressed to 
maintain, as does standard textbook labour market analysis, that the 
workers in any given Asian country participate in a single integrated labour 
market. It would be better to think of there being a multiplicity of labour 
market sectors and groups, each with its own particular conditions, linked 
one to another.4 
A thorough analysis of labour institutions as factors in Asian economic 
development would require several steps: 
— identifying the different sectors and groups; 
— studying the labour market functioning within each; 
— specifying the connections between the various sectors and groups; 
— analysing policy with the resultant model. 
In the following sections, I outline how these steps might be followed 
in multi-market analysis of three different types: heterogeneity of labour 
markets due to wage dualism and segmentation, heterogeneity of labour 
markets due to differences among workers in education and training, and 
heterogeneity of labour markets due to discrimination in favour of certain 
types of workers and against others. 
4
 Harriss, Kannan and Rodgers [1990] draw the useful distinction between 
"stratification" (when a labour market is characterized by a vertical layering of individuals) 
and "segmentation" (when labour markets work differently in different parts of an 
economy). 
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2. Wage dualism and segmentation 
In many economies, for workers of a given type, labour market 
rewards are higher in some sectors of the economy than in others. The 
general name given to this phenomenon is "labour market segmentation". 
Suppose that the appeal of a labour market can be summed up by a single 
variable called "wage".5 When the various segments can be grouped into 
two categories — those offering relatively high wages and those offering 
relatively low ones — the term used is "wage dualism". This subsection 
considers one type of wage dualism, that associated with wage floors. 
A wage floor is a rate below which wages cannot fall. As discussed 
above, wage floors may be caused by minimum wages, union wage 
increases, public sector pay policy, or something else. Wage dualism arises 
because of differential applicability of these wage-setting institutions in 
different parts of the economy. Wage dualism is a feature of many, but by 
no means all, Asian economies. 
In Fields [1992], I analyse wage floors in a two-sector context. Sector 
C is covered by a wage floor and sector N is not covered. Suppose that 
before the wage floor was imposed, a wage W* cleared the labour market. 
Then, in the covered sector, the wage is increased by g per cent compared 
with what it would have been otherwise: 
(1) Wc = W*(l + g). 
The higher wage lowers employment in the covered sector by ge per cent, 
where e is the (arc) wage elasticity of demand for labour in the covered 
sector evaluated between W* and Wc: 
(2) Ec = Ec* (1 + ge). 
Assume that there is no on-the-job search and that there is probabilistic 
hiring.6 Under these assumptions, workers who seek covered sector jobs 
must enter the covered sector labour market. Workers seeking covered 
sector jobs have expected wages: 
(3) E(WC) = Wc (Ec /Lc). 
5
 This is purely for terminological convenience. Differential job protection, fringe 
benefits, and the like are also of value to workers. So that we can work in two dimensions, 
we abstract from them here. 
6
 These are the assumptions made in the dualistic labour market models of Harris and 
Todaro [1970] and Mincer [1976] among others. It would be worth extending these models 
to consider other hiring rules. One such extension — preferential hiring on the basis of 
education — is outlined below. 
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Workers who settle for non-covered jobs receive WN. In equilibrium, these 
two expected wages are equal: 
(4) Wc (Ec /Lc) = WN. 
It is easy to see that the wage floor causes unemployment. This is 
because employers in the covered sector demand less labour at higher 
wages and because it is in some workers' interest to risk unemployment 
while trying to be hired for these relatively attractive jobs. From the 
equilibrium condition (4), the fact that Wc > WN implies that Lc > Ec, 
hence unemployment exists. 
It is less easy to determine what the amount of unemployment depends 
upon. The following results are proven in Fields [1992]: 
— A sector-specific wage floor may induce labour to move out of the 
covered sector or into the covered sector, depending upon parameter 
values. 
— Other things being equal, a greater elasticity of demand for labour in 
the covered sector may result either in less unemployment or in more 
unemployment in equilibrium, depending upon parameter values. 
— Other things equal, a greater elasticity of the wage in the noncovered 
sector with respect to the size of that sector's labour force may result 
either in more unemployment or in less unemployment in equilibrium, 
depending upon parameter values. 
— Other things equal, a higher wage floor may result either in more 
unemployment in equilibrium or in less unemployment in equilibrium, 
depending upon parameter values. 
In summary, these results suggest that the unemployment effects of 
wage floors are more complicated than had previously been recognized. 
Surely, a policy-maker would want to know how much unemployment is 
likely to be caused by a wage floor before deciding whether to establish 
one. Analyses of the type indicated above tell us what the answer depends 
upon. 
The theoretical model yields ambiguous results. So to assess the 
effects of wage floors, empirical estimates of the various parameter values 
within an empirically-relevant theoretical framework take on added 
importance. But before this can be done, the analytical framework would 
need to be extended beyond the factors considered above (the elasticity of 
demand for labour in the covered sector, the elasticity of the wage in the 
non-covered sector with respect to the size of the noncovered sector labour 
force, and the level of the wage floor) to consider also the effect of such 
additional labour market phenomena as job fixity, heterogeneous labour, 
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preferential hiring, and on-the-job search, all in a multi-period context. 
The analytical models required to determine the likely effects of this labour 
market institution (wage floors) are complex indeed. 
3. Heterogeneity of workers: Education and training 
Workers differ in terms of education, and these differences are 
relevant to labour market analysis. As a stylized version of these differ-
ences, suppose that there are just two categories of people: those educated 
and those not. Employers may hire workers from either or both of these 
groups. 
Much development effort is directed towards upgrading the education 
and training of a country's labour force. To determine the effects of 
educational expansion, models are needed of the educated and the 
uneducated labour markets and the linkages between them. The following 
is excerpted from a lengthier account [Fields, forthcoming]. 
(/') The market-clearing labour market model 
The standard labour market model, reviewed above in Section II, 
maintains that the wage in a labour market adjusts to equate the amount of 
labour supplied to the amount of labour demanded. When there are two 
types of workers, some educated and some not, the market-clearing 
paradigm holds that wages for the educated and the uneducated clear their 
respective markets. 
Figures 6 and 7 depict the initial supply and demand curves and wage 
rates in the two labour markets. The wage of educated workers is higher 
than the wage of uneducated workers. This is necessary to induce young 
people to incur the monetary and psychological costs of education and 
forego years of earnings while in school. 
If the educational system is expanded, the enlarged supply of 
graduates shifts the supply curve of educated labour to the right and the 
supply of curve of uneducated labour to the left. If the demand curve for 
labour is stationary, educational expansion in this case would lower the 
wages of the educated (from W*ed to W'ed) in order to employ them all and 
raise the wages of the uneducated, who are now relatively scarcer (from 
W^unedt0 W ' ^ ) . The market-clearing paradigm therefore predicts that the 
newly-educated would all be employed at higher wages than they would 
have received without the education. Society benefits from the gain in 
productivity associated with having more persons employed at higher 
wages and producing more. The social cost of education consists of the 
resources used in providing the additional education. 
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Figure 6 . Labour market for educated workers w i th market-clearing 
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Very different outcomes may result under other institutional 
circumstances. I now present two of these. 
(ii) Non-market-clearing wages: The case 
of labour market stratification 
Suppose that the wage paid to educated labour is above the 
market-clearing level. Educated persons seek the best-paying jobs in the 
economy. But because there are not enough high-paying jobs available for 
all the educated persons seeking them, we then need to ask what happens 
to the educated persons who do not get hired for these jobs. In the case of 
labour market stratification, we assume that all the educated continue to 
seek the better jobs. 
Now suppose that educational expansion takes place. Figure 8 shows 
what would happen to the educated persons' labour market. The rightward 
shift of the supply curve of educated labour simply adds to educated 
unemployment. This, in essence, is the explanation offered by Blaug, 
Layard, and Woodhall [1969] for educated unemployment in India: the 
surplus educated are willing to endure a spell of unemployment until they 
get hired. 
As for the uneducated persons' labour market, if their wages are set 
by supply and demand as in Figure 7, the leftward shift of their supply 
curve would result in higher wages for those who remain uneducated. But 
if their wages are also at higher-than-market-clearing levels, the effect is 
a reduction in unemployment, as shown in Figure 9. In this latter case, 
educational expansion simply results in a transformation of uneducated 
unemployment into educated unemployment. Considering the social costs 
involved in providing education, this is hardly a good way to achieve 
economic development. 
(Hi) Non-market-clearing wages: The case of bumping 
In the bumping model, as in the others presented above, education is 
a requirement for the higher-level jobs. But unlike the labour market 
stratification model, the bumping model makes two different assumptions. 
First, it maintains that educated workers would be willing to accept 
lower-level jobs if it pays them to do so. Second, it assumes that 
employers offering lower-level jobs are willing to hire educated workers 
in preference to uneducated workers at a wage which is set for the job, not 
for the characteristics of the worker hired to fill that job.7 
7
 If there were no educated unemployed, employers would have to offer educated 
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Let us call the higher-level jobs "skilled" and the lower-level jobs 
"unskilled." The labour market for the skilled jobs is shown in Figure 10. 
Educational expansion would shift the supply curve of labour to the skilled 
jobs to the right provided that some of the additional educated workers 
seek skilled jobs. Whether they do or not depends on a comparison 
between (i) an uncertain prospect of finding a job at the skilled wage, and 
(ii) the wage that could be received immediately upon accepting an 
unskilled job. In the case where there is no on-the-job search and where 
hiring is probabilistic, the expected values associated with these two labour 
market strategies are, respectively. 
V(i) = W s k TTsk 
and 
V(ii) = W ^ 
(When there is on-the-job search or when hiring is not probabilistic, the 
formulae for V(i) and V(ii) are different but the choice process facing 
educated workers is the same.) 
When educational expansion takes place, everyone must reoptimize. 
The educated workers compare V(i) and V(ii) and choose that labour 
market strategy which offers the highest rewards to them. The uneducated 
workers must then search from among those unskilled jobs that are left 
over for them after the educated workers are hired first. Depending on the 
country, it may be that the expected wage falls as a result of increased 
competition among the uneducated for the reduced number of unskilled 
jobs. Alternatively, it may be that unskilled jobs are available at the 
prevailing wage for all who seek them. 
Depending upon the initial parameter values, three patterns are 
possible for the effects of educational expansion: 
(i) The educated may all continue to search for skilled jobs. In this 
case, the analysis is identical to that presented just above in the labour 
market stratification case. 
(ii) Some of the educated may find it to their advantage to bump 
uneducated workers out of unskilled jobs. The larger the size of the 
educated persons' labour force, the greater the number who will do this. 
workers higher wages in unskilled jobs than they would offer to uneducated workers for 
those same jobs. The employer would do this if the extra productivity of the educated 
worker more than justified the extra cost of hiring him/her relative to an uneducated 
worker. However, when there is educated unemployment, employers can set the wage for 
the job, not the worker, and hire the best-qualified applicant at no extra cost. 
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Figure 8. Labour market for educated workers 
with above-market-clearing wage 
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Figure 9. Labour market for uneducated workers 
with above-market-clearing wage 
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Figure 10. Labour market for skilled jobs 
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If the uneducated workers have some place else to go, more of them will 
choose this other alternative — for example, going back to the farm in the 
case of a land-abundant economy. The expected wages of those educated 
remain constant, as do the expected wages of those uneducated. The 
economy now has more educated people performing unskilled jobs. Society 
benefits from the gain in productivity associated with such people. Again, 
this gain must be compared with the cost of producing the education. 
(iii) If some of the educated find it advantageous to bump uneducated 
workers out of unskilled jobs, the demand curve for uneducated workers 
in unskilled jobs shifts leftward at the same time that the supply curve of 
uneducated workers in unskilled jobs shifts leftward. If the uneducated 
workers do not have somewhere else to go (for example, because land is 
scarce and agricultural jobs are limited in number), it is quite possible that 
the demand curve for uneducated labour shifts leftward by more than the 
supply curve does, in which case the expected wage for uneducated labour 
falls; see Figure 11. A constant expected wage for educated labour coupled 
with a falling expected wage for uneducated labour produces a rising dif-
ferential between the educated and the uneducated. In such a case, educa-
tional expansion causes the uneducated to fall further and further behind. 
Relatively speaking, education becomes more and more valuable, as those 
without it become condemned to ever-poorer labour market opportunities. 
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This may cause more and more education to be demanded. And if, in res-
ponse, more and more education is supplied, the society may end up with 
everyone seeking education. 
In summary, in these three alternative labour market models, educa-
tional expansion has very different consequences. The last thing that a poor 
Asian country wants to do is use its scarce budgetary resources to produce 
more educated unemployment with no corresponding increase in the pro-
ductivity of those employed. Before a policy of educational expansion is 
chosen, the authorities must have a clear idea of which of these three 
models best fits the country's circumstances. 
4. Heterogeneity of workers: Labour market discrimination 
Many Asian workers suffer discrimination — some because of race, 
some because of caste, some because of ethnicity, and many because of 
gender.8 Some of this discrimination takes place in the labour market, pri-
marily on the part of employers, and some prior to labour market entry, 
on the part of parents, schools, and others. It is important to pinpoint the 
locus of the discrimination if progress is to be made in eliminating it. 
Following Arrow [1973], we may define current labour market discri-
mination as "the valuation in the labour market of personal characteristics 
of the worker that are unrelated to productivity". Such labour market dis-
crimination may take many forms. Among them are: 
— wage discrimination — paying differential wages to equally productive 
workers; 
— employment discrimination — the preferential hiring of members of 
the favoured group; 
— occupational segregation — the stereotyping of jobs (e.g. "men's 
jobs" and "women's jobs") and the assignment of members of 
different groups to different jobs; 
— crowding — the involuntary confinement of members of the less 
favoured group to the less desirable occupations or sectors; 
— statistical discrimination — selecting individuals for employment or 
training on the basis of easily-observable attributes (race, ethnicity, 
gender,...) which are thought to be related to productivity. 
See, for instance, Dreze and Sen [1989]. 
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Figure 1 1 . Labour market for unskilled jobs 
when demand for uneducated workers shifts 
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In view of these forms of discrimination, the literature on the 
economics of discrimination offers different models of how discrimination 
is effectuated and what might be done to eliminate differences in labour 
market outcomes due to discrimination. Four analytical approaches are 
briefly reviewed below. 
(i) The tastes model 
Most closely associated with Becker [1957], the tastes model holds 
that firms enter the labour market with prejudicial tastes. These may ori-
ginate with the employer, who dislikes hiring workers of a certain type; 
with co-workers, who dislike working alongside or under members of the 
discriminated-against group; and/or customers, who dislike being served 
by members of certain groups. These prejudicial tastes lead each firm to 
behave as if it had its own "market discrimination coefficient", viz., a pre-
mium that it would have to be paid, or a cost saving that it would have to 
realize, before it would be willing to deal with members of the discriminat-
ed-against group. For instance, when employer i considers whom to hire, 
s/he would behave as if the wage rate w were the cost of hiring someone 
from the favoured group and 7r (1 + dj) the cost of hiring someone from 
the unfavoured group. Here, dj is employer i's market discrimination 
coefficient. 
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Becker notes that what matters for the economic well-being of the 
workers involved is not only the average of these market discrimination 
coefficients but also the distribution of them. If all employers discriminate 
against the same groups, those who suffer this discrimination will assuredly 
lose out economically. But if there are enough employers who are not 
discriminatory, workers of different types will be sorted among employers 
with different tastes for discrimination. The result might be segregation in 
the labour market (e.g. type A workers working for type A employers, 
type B workers working for type B employers) with little adverse effect on 
the economic well-being of either group. 
Becker's analysis of discrimination in terms of prejudicial tastes is 
appealing. In my view, though, it has two problems. One is that the model 
allows for discrimination to be practised only through wage discrimination; 
non-wage discrimination is not allowed for. Employment discrimination 
may be much more important in many Asian contexts, e.g. against mem-
bers of scheduled castes in India. The other problem with Becker's analysis 
is his policy conclusion. He observes that discriminatory employers are 
knowingly foregoing profits by not employing the most productive 
workers. If competition in product markets is sufficiently keen, those 
employers who discriminate would earn sub-normal profits, and for this 
reason would be driven out of business. Nothing needs to be done about 
discrimination, he concludes. It will fall of its own weight. This conclusion 
reflects a greater faith in product market competition than I think is 
warranted. A more activist approach is almost surely needed. 
(ii) Crowding 
In this model, which is developed in Bergmann [1971] and Madden 
[1973], discrimination takes the form of employers systematically 
excluding members of certain groups from certain jobs. Those who are 
excluded from the better jobs are then crowded into lesser jobs. Figures 12 
and 13 illustrate the consequences. 
Suppose that in the absence of crowding, the two sectors A and B 
would have been equally remunerative. However, sector A employers 
refuse to consider certain people for jobs. SA is the true supply of labour 
curve, SA' the effective labour supply after the exclusion. The wage in 
sector A rises (which may be precisely why the exclusion arises in the first 
place). Those crowded out of sector A are crowded into sector B. There, 
the supply of labour curve shifts from SB to SB' and the wage is bid down 
from WB to WB'. So the effect of crowding is to provide economic gain to 
those who attain employment in the favoured sector and to impose econo-
mic losses on those who are crowded into the lower-paying sectors. 
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Figure 12. Labour market consequence of crowding workers out of Sector A 
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Figure 13. Labour market consequence of crowding workers into Sector B 
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By allowing for employment discrimination, the crowding model 
meets one of the objections to the taste model. However, the crowding 
model does not allow for variation among employers, nor does it allow for 
wage discrimination within the same sector. 
(Hi) The imperfect information model 
This model holds that employers practice statistical discrimination 
against members of groups which they (the employers) believe will be of 
lower productivity [Phelps, 1972]. Statistical discrimination creates the 
possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, if employers believe 
that women will quit more often than men, and act on that belief by not 
training or promoting women, women will respond by not remaining on 
the job very long. (Men would do the same if they were discriminated 
against in that way.) The policy intervention called for is affirmative 
action: force employers to give women the opportunity so that women can 
prove themselves. 
(iv) The radical model 
This model analyses discrimination in quite different terms from the 
first three. One adherent of this model, Reich [1977], sees racism and 
other types of discrimination as "rooted in the capitalist system". Racism, 
he says, enables capitalists to divide workers' strength and gain at workers' 
expense. His analysis "follows the Marxian paradigm in arguing that racial 
attitudes and racist institutions must be seen as part of a larger social 
system, in placing emphasis on conflict between classes and the use of 
power to determine the outcomes of such conflicts". To Reich and others, 
discrimination can be done away with only if the larger social system is 
fundamentally changed. 
I see two problems with the radical model, one technical and one 
practical. The technical problem is that the model requires that capitalists 
work together as a class to practice discrimination. In my view, there are 
great difficulties in coordinating capitalists to behave in racist fashion and 
large incentives for any single capitalist to cheat and break away from any 
discriminatory coalition. The practical problem is that a fundamental 
change in social systems away from capitalism hardly seems to be in the 
cards at the present time. The world of today seems to be moving in quite 
the opposite direction. 
In summary: Discrimination is pervasive in many Asian labour 
markets. Yet, the precise mechanisms by which discrimination is 
manifested at the market level need to be clearly articulated. What 
substitutions are made by employers? What adjustments by workers? How 
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do these interact with segmented job opportunities? Many theories have 
been put forth in other contexts, but much still needs to be specified. 
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